More Juror Misconduct Related to Social Media

Much of the news these days about social media and the law revolves around jurors’ improper use of social platforms. There have already been two reported cases in 2012 that dealt with potential misconduct by jurors.

In People v. Wilson, a New York appellate court upheld the trial court’s refusal to set aside a verdict based on a juror’s Facebook posting that simply informed her friends that she was serving on a jury:

The court conducted a thorough hearing, and we find no basis for disturbing its credibility determinations. The juror made Facebook postings that merely advised her friends that she was on a jury, but did not discuss the case in any way. Unfortunately, some of her friends made foolish replies relating to trials in general that defendant characterizes as “inflammatory.” However, the juror testified unequivocally that she was not affected by these comments, that she did not discuss the case with anyone during the trial, and that she had decided the case impartially, based only on the evidence.

People v. Wilson, — N.Y.S.2d —, 2012 WL 787553, at *2 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.) (March 13, 2012). The Wilson court got it right; it should not be “misconduct” to simply post or tweet: “Hey, I’m on jury duty!” The case is interesting, however, because it points out the impact that comments may have. It appears the defense argued that the inflammatory comments in response to the innocuous update might have resulted in misconduct. In this case, the juror confirmed that the comments did not affect her partiality. But I imagine that, more and more, we will see “misconduct” cases based not only on what the juror said but what the juror’s friends or followers said in response.

In another recent case, Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss an empanelled juror. The trial court characterized its decision to remove the juror as “a very close call” but, ultimately, ConAgra was able to convince the trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals that dismissal was appropriate; ”counsel for ConAgra informed the trial court that counsel had found, separate and apart from litigation history information, that Juror Piedimonte had a Facebook page and was ‘a prolific poster for anti-corporation, organic foods.’ ConAgra moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, to strike Juror Piedimonte because of his alleged misconduct during voir dire, claiming he intentionally failed to disclose information that affected his ability to be a fair and impartial juror.” Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,  2012 WL 694827, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. March 6, 2012).

Subsequent to the jury being empanelled, but prior to opening statements, ConAgra presented the trial court with copies of material from Juror Piedimonte’s Facebook page and personal blog allegedly relating to “corporate criminals, credit rating agencies, economic warfare, socialism,” and moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, to strike Juror Piedimonte. The trial court conducted an examination of Juror Piedimonte to determine the existence of his alleged bias toward corporations.

Id. at *7. Both the trial court and the appellate court recognized that ”[r]eplacement of a juror with an alternate is an appropriate remedy when there is a possibility of bias.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, replacement of this particular juror was appropriate given the circumstances.

The Khoury case is interesting because it doesn’t directly deal with misconduct by the juror during the trial. Rather, ConAgra used the juror’s Facebook page and blog to show that the juror had been less than truthful during voir dire and that he could not be impartial. This was enough to get the juror knocked off the panel (although it was a very close call).

Jurors and social media are often like oil and water; they just don’t mix well. I am glad that the Wilson court reached the right result. There is no harm from a juror saying “I’m currently serving.” Other courts should follow this example.

The Khoury decision is dicier. I’m sure that, with thorough search efforts and techniques, any lawyer could come up with enough “impeachment” evidence to successfully challenge a juror during voir dire (or, as was the case here, point out that the juror was less than truthful during voir dire — do you remember what your status update was two years ago?). Fortunately, the court(s) recognized that this was a “close” call. Courts should be hesitant to disqualify jurors based on general statements made on social media sites, particularly where the statements pre-date or are unrelated to the trial for which the juror may sit. In Khoury, the facts were unique and the court(s) recognized that. Hopefully, other courts won’t fall further down this slippery slope.

More Juror Misconduct via Twitter – New Trial Ordered

In yet another example of juror misconduct on Twitter, a death-row inmate in Arkansas has been given a new trial.  The Arkansas Supreme Court recently reversed the murder conviction of Erickson Dimas-Martinez (convicted in 2010). The reversal is actually based on the (mis)conduct of two jurors: one who kept falling asleep and the other who tweeted a little too much about the trial.

The tweet instigating the whole matter seemed relatively harmless (except for the fact that it was made during the lunch break on the day that all of the sentencing evidence was presented): “Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line.” The defense jumped all over the tweet arguing that: (1) it was clearly a comment on the case; (2) a known reporter was following the juror’s twitter account; and (3) the tweet violated the court’s order and “instruction against twittering” and further demonstrated that the juror could not (or would not) follow the court’s directions. The following exchange between the judge and the twittering-juror ensued:

THE COURT: Now, it has been brought to my attention that during – during
the course of the trial that you have from time to time, uh, twittered, whatever that
is. Have you?

JUROR [2]: Um, I twittered like day three in court or, you know, something
about – not necessarily the case but just the time link about the court.

THE COURT: All right. But you haven’t –

JUROR [2]: Not discussed any of the case.

THE COURT: Well, I want to ask you about a specific twitter and, uh, I want you to think about it and then tell me what it means.

JUROR [2]: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. It’s says: Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line. About 20 hours ago via text. Now what does that mean?

JUROR [2]: Well, I’m a little shocked. That’s a little creepy. But, uh, it means, um –

THE COURT: Would you prefer to come up here to the bench?

JUROR [2]: Yeah. Um, what it means – oh, wait. You want me to come up there?

THE COURT: I was gonna bring you up here if you’re –

JUROR [2]: I can say it.

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

JUROR [2]: I’m not having trouble.

THE COURT: All right.

JUROR [2]: What it means was, um, not only like to pertain to this case but also to future stuff. Um, obviously, whatever we as a jury decide – you know, I’m not necessarily saying I know what’s going to be decided, but we have to decide – make a huge decision. Either way, you know, if we do decide something like it’s just gonna – a lot of people are either going to be mad about it watching the news because, you know, people have expressed to me you’re on that court case, right? I can’t talk about it. So I leave. So there’s a ton of people watching this. And either way we decide, people are either going to be angry or people are going to be hurt either way. So what I was meaning by that was, you know, we have to define the great line of, you know, where we stand on a subject and, you know, what we have to choose – decide in the future. And also “Define the Great Line” was an Underoath album, and I thought I’d throw that in there along with my tweet.

THE COURT: Well, have you already made up your mind in this case what you’re going to – how you’re going to vote?

JUROR [2]: No, because I’m waiting for the other 11 to help me come to a conclusion.

THE COURT: All right.

JUROR [2]: But I’m trying to prepare myself just because you know, um, the death penalty or even this case is a little uncomfortable just because, um, I have not seen death in my life, like, firsthand. So the talk of death is a little uncomfortable just because it’s an unknown – it’s an unknown area for me.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stone, do you have any questions of [Juror 2]?

MR. STONE: No, I don’t.

THE COURT: Ms. Streett?

MS. STREETT: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right, have – now, have you followed the Court’s instructions about not discussing the particulars of this case with anybody?

JUROR [2]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

The trial court overruled the misconduct claims and allowed the matter to proceed. In response to the claim that the juror could not follow instructions, the lower “court disagreed, however, ruling that even though the juror admitted to disregarding the instruction not to tweet, it was not a ‘material breach of my instruction or of his oath.’ Thus, the court refused to strike Juror 2 from the panel.”

Surprisingly, the juror continued to tweet during trial. As described by the Arkansas Supreme Court:

More troubling is the fact that after being questioned about whether he had tweeted during the trial, Juror 2 continued to tweet during the trial. Once counsel for Appellant learned of this they moved for a new trial, arguing that this was further evidence of the juror’s inability to follow the court directives such that it constituted juror misconduct. In his motion for new trial, Appellant stated that Juror 2 tweeted two different times on April 1, 2010, during the time the jury was deliberating in the sentencing phase. Specifically, at 1:27 p.m., Juror 2 tweeted: “If its wisdom we seek. . . We should run to the strong tower.” Then, again at 3:45 p.m., he tweeted, “Its over.” But, the jury did not announce that it had reached a sentence until 4:35 p.m. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial, finding that Appellant suffered no prejudice.

The Arkansas Supreme Court was not as sympathetic. Recognizing that a juror violated the court’s instructions, was called out for it, and then continued to do it, caused grave concern on appeal.  The fact that a reporter was following this particular account was important; the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it was “unacceptable” for the media to know the results of a jury’s deliberations before the court. And, of particular note, the court generally surmised:

Because of the very nature of Twitter as an on online social media site, Juror 2’s tweets about the trial were very much public discussions. Even if such discussions were one-sided, it is in no way appropriate for a juror to state musings, thoughts, or other information about a case in such a public fashion.

In ordering a new trial, the Arkansas Supreme Court went on to discuss other things. But they left us with this nugget:

Finally, we take this opportunity to recognize the wide array of possible juror misconduct that might result when jurors have unrestricted access to their mobile phones during a trial. Most mobile phones now allow instant access to a myriad of information. Not only can jurors access Facebook, Twitter, or other social media sites, but they can also access news sites that might have information about a case. There is also the possibility that a juror could conduct research about many aspects of a case. Thus, we refer to the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice and the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice for consideration of the question of whether jurors’ access to mobile phones should be limited during a trial.

We could soon live in a day where jurors have no access to their mobile devices.

Here is the full opinion: Erickson Dimas-Martinez v. State of Arkansas, 2011 Ark. 515 (Dec. 8, 2011).